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Introduction
The debt crisis in Europe has put renewed emphasis on the sustainability and prudence of fiscal policies. The fiscal problems of countries like Portugal and Greece, which entered the crisis with high debt levels, suggest that excessive deficits under the common currency and frequent non-compliance with the deficit limits have been major factors that contributed to the severity of the debt crisis. This view had sufficient support to produce a series of political activities that led to more stringent fiscal rules. Among other things, a new fiscal compact requires euro members to introduce debt brakes into national legislation, preferable at a constitutional level.
While some countries started out with already high public debt, countries like Ireland and Spain had comparatively sound levels before the financial crisis and banks' balance sheet problems and public bailouts of banks have been prominent reasons for exploding public debt levels and reduced investor confidence.
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In this paper we look for evidence whether euro membership indeed has changed fiscal behavior in a systematic way and made it less prudent. We do so by using panel data of European countries to estimate fiscal reaction functions. From the intertemporal budget constraint of governments a higher stock of public debt must be associated with a higher level of discounted aggregated primary surpluses in the future. While it is unclear when exactly such a reaction of the primary surplus should happen, previous studies have found significant immediate reactions (Bohn 1998, Mendoza and Ostry 2008) that document governments' efforts towards financial sustainability.
In our panel data of European countries, we compare three different time periods. We may consider the time before the signing of the Maastricht Treaty as the period during which countries were neither influenced by a common currency, nor by the aspirations to be accepted to the common currency. In the period between signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the start of the common currency (aspiration period), countries had to work towards the Maastricht criteria for acceptance into the European Monetary Union (EMU) and may therefore have been subject to increased fiscal responsibility. Finally, we consider the time since full membership as a separate period which is of special interest. While the stability and growth pact required continued efforts to contain government deficits, the frequent infringements of the 3%-deficit rule, the weakening of the rules and the moral hazard effects from implicit bailout guarantees (i.e., a non credible no-bailout clause) may have reduced government efforts below the aspiration period or even below the pre-Maastricht period.
Using fiscal reaction functions for a panel of actual euro-area countries the paper investigates whether euro membership has reduced the responsiveness of countries to increases in the level of inherited debt compared to the period prior to succession to the euro. While we find some evidence for such a loss in prudence, the results are not robust to changes in the specification, as for example an exclusion of Greece from the panel. This suggests that the current debt problems may result to a large extent from pre-existing debt levels prior to entry or from a larger need for fiscal prudence in a common currency, while an adverse change in the fiscal reaction functions for most countries does not apply.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the intertemporal budget constraint of the government as a starting point for the analysis of sustainability issues. Section 3 introduces the concept of the fiscal reaction functions. Section 4 provides some descriptives before Section 5 presents the main empirical results. Section 6 provides some conclusions.
The Sustainability of Government Debt
The assessment of the sustainability of government finances usually starts from the intertemporal budget constraint of the government. Assuming a time invariant interest rate, the governmental budget constraint can be expressed as:
( 1) where ‫ܦ‬ ௧ denotes the actual stock of real debt, ݅ stands for the nominal interest rate, ‫ܦ‬ ௧ିଵ represents the pre-existing stock of debt and ܵ ௧ is the primary (non-interest) balance, with ܵ ௧ < 0 representing a primary surplus. Normalizing the stock of public debt and the primary deficit by nominal GDP and solving equation (1) forward in time yield the following intertemporal budget constraint
where β and π are the real growth rate and the inflation rate (that for simplicity are assumed to be time invariant). Discounting equation (2) to time zero, i.e. multiplying both sides by ቂ ଵା ሺଵାఉሻሺଵାగሻ ቃ ் , and taking the limit as ܶ → ∞ yields the present value budget constraint:
Fiscal sustainability for ሺ1 + ݅ሻ > ሺ1 + ߚሻሺ1 + ߨሻ requires that the government does not engage in a Ponzi scheme, where all the interest payments are covered by new debt. The no-Ponzi or transversality condition is technically stated by the fact that the present discounted value of the government debt-to-GDP ratio converges to zero in the limit:
Inserting this transversality condition into equation (3) yields a formal definition for sustainability:
From equation (5), a sustainable fiscal policy requires that the value of the initial debt-to-GDP ratio equals the negative present value of all future primary deficit ratios. Equation (5) is only satisfied if the transversality condition, equation (4), is fulfilled (see e.g. Ley 2010 ).
There exists a large body of empirical studies that examines whether (4) and (5) are fulfilled. Hamilton and Flavin (1986) was an early study using a direct empirical approach to test the presence of no-Ponzi games. Employing annual U.S.
data over the period 1960 -1984 they find evidence for a sustainable fiscal policy in the US. Numerous studies followed which conducted empirical tests on the intertemporal budget constraint mostly for the US but also for other countries;
yielding partly different conclusions concerning the fiscal sustainability of the respective states (see e.g. Wilcox 1989 , Kremers 1989 , Haug 1990 , Hakkio and Rush 1991 or Trehan and Walsh 1991 .
These standard test procedures are conducted under the strong assumption of certainty. However, Bohn (1998) as well as Perotti (2007) emphasize that expectations and uncertainty, surrounding prospect fiscal variables, play an important role in the assessment of fiscal policy. In the presence of uncertainty an adequate solvency test requires a correct discount factor, which is determined by the marginal rate of substitution between consumption at time t and time t+1, rather than the "safe interest rate". The possibility that some of the existing empirical tests rest on incorrect discount factors casts doubt on their reliability. However, since the correct discount factor is based on several assumptions about prospective states of nature that are hard to estimate Bohn (1998) suggests the alternative concept of a fiscal reaction function ("model-based sustainability" approach i.e. MBS), to assess fiscal sustainability. In contrast to the standard empirical methods, the MBS approach tests for particular time series properties of fiscal data and does not require any assumptions about the appropriate discount factors. In addition, the MBS approach neither requires specific assumptions about the debt structure in terms of its composition nor does this approach require any particular information on the design of fiscal policy.
Fiscal Reaction Functions
The idea of Bohn's (1998) MBS approach rests on the analysis of how the primary fiscal balance (i.e. fiscal balance excluding the interest payments on public debt) reacts to variations in the sovereign debt caused by economic shocks. In such a framework, fiscal policy is considered sustainable once the government reacts systematically to a change in public debt by adjusting the primary fiscal balance. The intuition is, that if a fiscal policy is considered sustainable prior to a certain economic shock, the absence of any systematic policy reaction to this shock would cause the additionally issued debt to be uncovered by future surpluses, thus violating the noPonzi condition. Therefore, the government has to react systematically to the extended debt-to-GDP ratio by increasing the primary surplus-to-GDP ratio, in order to maintain fiscal sustainability.
In the simplest and most common version it assumes a linear connection between the inherited debt level and the primary surplus of period t. 
Descriptive Statistics
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Empirical Analysis of Fiscal Adjustments
Our cross-country application of Bohn's (1998) Bohn's (1998) MBS approach. We will start by examining how the primary surplus to GDP ratio in the EMU reacts to variations in the debt-to-GDP ratio by estimating variants of the equation
where ‫ݏ‬ ,௧ is the primary surplus, ݀ ,௧ିଵ denotes the lagged debt to GDP ratio, ܸ ,௧ is a vector which includes a set of determinants of the primary surplus and ߝ ,௧ represents an error term. Following Greiner et al. (2007) we use lagged values of debt to GDP rather than actual values to avoid simultaneity problems. Depending on the model specification the vector ܸ ,௧ includes different regressors following the relevant literature (e.g., Bohn 1998, Mendoza and Ostry 2008) . Table 1 reports results for variants of equation (7). All regressions include country fixed effects; the t-statistics are corrected for potential heteroskedasticity and country-specific serial correlation in the residuals. Column I presents a regression that uses the lagged debt to GDP ratio as the only regressor. Column II displays the results for a specification that adds a measure of the output deviation as an explanatory In a next step, we ask whether the prudence of fiscal policies has been thwarted by euro membership and euro-area countries have changed their fiscal behavior. In particular, we are interested in the possibility that fiscal reaction functions differ across different periods. We may consider the time before the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (pre) as a stage during which countries were neither influenced by having a common currency, nor by the aspirations to be accepted to the common currency. In the period between signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the start of the common currency countries faced the Maastricht criteria that were important for acceptance into EMU with possibly stronger incentives for fiscal responsibility. More precisely, from 1992 we define a country to be in this aspiration period once it is also an official member of the European exchange rate mechanism, but not a euro member yet. Finally, we consider the time since full membership (eur) as a separate time period that is of special interest. Table 3A (8) where again ܸ ,௧ is a vector that includes a set of determinants of the primary surplus.
The dummy variable ‫݁ݎ‬ equals one for the time before the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the dummy variable ‫ݎݑ݁‬ equals one since full euro membership (i.e. 1999 for most countries). In addition, ‫݁ݎ‬ • ݀ ,௧ିଵ ‫ݎݑ݁(‬ • ݀ ,௧ିଵ ) represent interaction terms between the debt-to-GDP ratio in the previous period and the ‫݁ݎ‬ dummy (the ‫ݎݑ݁‬ dummy). Depending on the model specification, ܸ ,௧ also includes the percentage deviation of real GDP from its trend and the percentage deviation of total government expenditures to its trend like in Table 1 . As we want to test for the change in fiscal behavior within the three periods the coefficients of interest are ߩ, ߚ ଷ ܽ݊݀ ߚ ସ . The coefficient ߩ determines whether the primary surplus reacts systematically to variations in the lagged debt to GDP ratio in the aspiration period, which econometrically serves as the default period. The coefficient ߚ ଷ shows whether the response of the primary surplus to changes in the inherited debt to GDP ratio is different within the aspiration period and the pre-Maastricht period. The main coefficient of interest is ߚ ସ that captures a possible difference between the aspiration period and the period of euro membership. No. of observations 512 511 404 Note: All regressions include unreported country fixed effects. The sample is unbalanced and covers years 1970-2011. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation in the errors. "*", "**" and "***" denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent confidence level, respectively. Output deviation and expenditure deviation are calculated from the cyclical components from the Hodrick-Prescott filter and included in percent of the trend figures.
The results that derive from this exercise seem to be in line with a popular view that, while governments undertook efforts to secure entry into EMU, the fiscal rules of EMI were insufficient to produce a similarly high level of fiscal prudence after countries were admitted to the euro: in all three specifications, the relevant interaction term eur_lagged_debt is negative, twice at the 5 percent level, once at the 10 percent level. At the same time, in all three regressions the inclusion of the coefficients debt-gdp ratio and eur_lagged_debt continues to yield a significant positive reaction to debt shocks, which can be interpreted in favor of an overall sustainable policy. This is in contrast to what can be said for the pre-Maastricht period; the addition of debt-gdp ratio (.78) and pre_lagged_debt (-.75) leads to an overall effect indistinguishable from zero. It may be noted, however, that the levels of primary surpluses were somewhat higher in the pre-Maastricht period than in the aspiration period, as indicated by the positive estimates for pre.
Fiscal reactions of euro members to debt shocks, according to Table 2 Table 2 ignore country heterogeneity. While the short experience with fiscal policies in the euro era suggests using panel data, the results reflect the fiscal reactions of quite heterogeneous countries. A special concern may be related to Greece. While the data used in our regressions are based on revised data, the political process in Greece had to rely on cross misstatements of the budget deficit.
To investigate the robustness of our results, Table 3 presents results based on omission of the crisis years 2009-2011. As can be seen, this severely reduces the significance of the interaction term eur_lagged_debt, which turns insignificant in two out of three regressions and is only significant at the ten percent level in column III.
While this reduced significance could result from a reduction in the relevant observations for euro members, it may also be seen as a warning against premature conclusions from Table 2 . No. of observations 461 461 354 Note: All regressions include unreported country fixed effects. The sample is unbalanced and covers years 1970-2011. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation in the errors. "*", "**" and "***" denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent confidence level, respectively. Output deviation and expenditure deviation are calculated from the cyclical components from the Hodrick-Prescott filter and included in percent of the trend figures.
As noted, another issue is that the results about a reduced fiscal reaction to debt shocks may come from heterogeneity or may rest only on a small subgroup of countries. Therefore we ran robustness checks by in turn leaving out one country after the other. Results are reported in Table 4 which is based on regressions using years 1970-2011. Again, we are particularly interested in the robustness of the negative eur_lagged_debt coefficient. We find that the results are pretty stable for all exclusions but one: leaving Greece out of the sample, the magnitude of the coefficient drops by two-thirds and its significance is lost. The result of the regressions in Table 2 , which suggested euro membership has significantly decreased fiscal reactions to debt, seems to be very strongly based on the change in Greek fiscal policy compared to pre-euro years.
There are two potential explanations that come to mind. A first one is that the data we are using is not the data that was available to Greek parliament and the wider public at the time budgets were drafted. The extensive fabrication of Greek budget deficit numbers has been extensively documented.
3 Interestingly, rerunning the regression III of Table 3 with the initially reported Greek deficit figures for the years 2000-2008 using the data provided by European Commission (2010) implies that pre_lagged_debt looses even significance at the 10 percent level.
Another possible explanation is that due to the week political governance, Greece was particularly prone to consume the increased fiscal leeway from reduced interest rates after euro accession, blocking out the need to react to increases in debt levels. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation in the errors. "*", "**" and "***" denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent confidence level, respectively. While the regression includes output and expenditure deviation, Table 4 does not report the respective results. Output deviation and expenditure deviation are calculated from the cyclical components from the Hodrick-Prescott filter and included in percent of the trend figures. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation in the errors. "*", "**" and "***" denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent confidence level, respectively. While the regression includes output and expenditure deviation, Table 4 does not report the respective results. Output deviation and expenditure deviation are calculated from the cyclical components from the Hodrick-Prescott filter and included in percent of the trend figures.
It is worth emphasizing that, unlike the exclusion of Greece, other exclusions have only mild effects. Dropping Italy increases the standard error of eur_lagged_debt and the significance level of this variable is consequently somewhat reduced. However, the point estimate is largely unaffected in this case. A country that has some importance for the size of the estimated coefficient eur_lagged_debt is Belgium. Dropping Belgium from the sample, but keeping Greece, indicates a larger differential effect compared to the aspiration period. All regressions include a constant. Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation in the errors. "*", "**" and "***" denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent confidence level, respectively. While the regression includes output and expenditure deviation, Table 4 does not report the respective results. Output deviation and expenditure deviation are calculated from the cyclical components from the Hodrick-Prescott filter and included in percent of the trend figures. The shaded rows mark those countries with a significantly negative estimate for eur_lagged_debt.
The sensitivity of the results to exclusion of countries suggests looking at all individual country's reaction functions to check for further country particularities. Table 6 provides the relevant results for the panel from 1970-2011. In total we find four countries in the sample that have a significantly negative coefficient for eur_lagged_debt. Apart from low-debt Luxemburg, these countries are France, Greece, and Portugal. 4 Belgium has a large positive coefficient, but it is insignificant.
The results from Estonia, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta are reported, but due to their very recent euro membership these countries have only very few observations for which eur equals one and no stark conclusions should be drawn from their coefficient for eur_lagged_debt, in particular as these observations are almost exclusively from crisis years.
While Greece, Portugal and France have significantly negative coefficients for eur_lagged_debt, in all three cases the fiscal reaction coefficients for the aspiration period (debt-gdp ratio) has been very large. The coefficients estimated for pre_lagged_debt indicate that the fiscal reaction functions in the aspiration period for
France, Greece and also, at least to some extent, for Portugal have been much more responsive to the debt level than in the pre-Maastricht period. Here the individual country results suggest that the efforts were not maintained after acceptance into EMU.
Conclusions
In this study we made use of fiscal reaction functions, which measure the budgetary reactions to countries' debt levels, to evaluate debt sustainability. Our consideration of different regimes (pre-Maastricht, aspiration period, EMU membership) has shown no clear evidence for a systematic reduction in fiscal prudence. While a panel regression for all Euro member countries suggests such a reduction has taken place, this result is not robust to the exclusion of a single country (Greece) and to the exclusion of crisis years. At the same time, individual country regressions suggest that for a group of three highly indebted countries (France, Greece, and Portugal) the strong reactions of primary deficits to changes in debt levels prior to accession to EMU could not be preserved within EMU.
Clearly, the analysis of fiscal reaction functions, like other statistical measures, is just one tool among several to gauge the prudence of fiscal policies. As the European debt crisis suggest, many aspects are important for the overall 
